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Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism, Again 
Peter Singer, in his essay "Utilitarianism 
and Vegetarianism" (Philosoohv and Public 
Affairs, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 325-37),1 has 
gone some distance toward clarifying his 
view of the utilitarian case for the ob­
ligation to be vegetarian. The fact that 
this clearer statement of his position was 
prompted, at least in part, by an essay of 
mine ("Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and 
Animal Rights," Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, vol. 9, no. 4, 305-324) provides 
me with some assurance that my own essay 
was not entirely idle, and though I am 
tempted to leave matters stand at that, 
there are a few points in Singer's essay 
that constrain me to offer this brief 
reply. My remarks fall into three cate­
gories: (1) Misunderstandings; (2) 
The coherence of utilitarianism; and (3) 
Singer's attempt to base vegetarianism on 
utility. 
(1) ~isunderstandings
Singer. I believe, misunderstands my 
posi:ion on a number of different counts. 
Two deserve a sketch here. The first, 
and the principa~ misunderstanding cannot, 
1 think, fairly be laid at my door. For 
Singer interprets me as holding the view 
that utilitarianism ought to be abandoned 
because it fails to account for our obli­
gation to be vegetarian~ (p. 326) But 
this extraordinary position is one I neither 
explicitly advance nor imply. What I do 
argue, though confessedly in only the 
barest outline, in my essay's second part, 
is that utilitarianism cannot adequately 
account for our duties to severely mentally 
enfeebled human beings (henceforth referred 
t.o as "non-paradigmatic humans"2.); that 
other, non-utilitarian theories (including 
my interpretations of Kantianism and egoism) 
also fail on this score; that a rights-based 
theory seems to provide the most adequate 
basis on which to rest our duties to non­
paradigmatic humans; and, finally, that 
consistency will oblige us to recognize the 
basic moral rights of many non-human 
animals, because of their relevant similar­
ities to non-paradigmatic humans, if we are 
rationally constrained to recognize the basis 
moral rights of these humans. Thus, it is 
because, in my view, utilitarianism, among 
other failings,S fails to provide an ade­
quate basis on which to ground our duties to 
certain human beings, not because it fails 
to support vegetarianism, that I believe it 
ought to be abandoned. The obligation to 
be vegetarian, in other words, is, in my 
view, not a basis on which to test the 
adequa~of competing moral theories. It 
is, rather, ~ conseguence that follows 
from our having developed that theory which, 
among the contenders, looks to be the most 
reasonable. Thus, to argue, as I do, 
that Singer fails to show that utilitarianism 
leads to the obligation to be vegetarian is 
a very different position than to aruge, 
as I most certainly do not. that "utili­
tarianism should be abandoned because it 
does not lead to vegetarianism." (p. 327) 
A second misunderstanding concerns my 
view of the relevance of consequences within 
a rights-based theory. On this matter 
Singer writes the following: 
Regan suggests that by basing the case 
for vegetarianism on animals' rights 
I 'could dispense with the need 
systematically to investigate the 
probably consequences of changing our 
eating habits'. This suggestion 
strikes me as quite wrong-headed, 
rather like telling the President 
that by basing his case on the moral 
principle that it is always legitimate 
to resist aggression, he can dispense 
with the need systematically to inves­
tigate the probable consequences of a 
nuclear reponse to Soviet military 
initiatives. In contrast to Regan, 
I think we should always try to find out 
as much as possible about the probably 
consequences of our actions (p. 328). 
What I want to say is that I, too, think 
that consequences are relevant to the 
determination of what are our obligations, 
and that I, too, think it would be quite 
"wrong-headed" to exclude considerations 
about consequences altogether. This is a 
point I have gone to some length to try 
to make clear, not only in the particular 
case of vegetarianism4 but elseWhere,S 
and it is a point I shall return to in (3) 
below. The point I was trying to make in 
the passage alluded to by Singer is not 
that consequences are always and totally 
irrelevant; rather, what I was suggesting 
is that if animals have rights, and if 
their rights are being violated by p;esent 
farming methods, then one could argue that 




consequences of these present practices are. 
For, if this treatment violates their rights, 
then, .whatever the consequences are, one could 
maintain that this treatment is wrong. But 
though this is the central point I wished to 
make, in the passage alluded to by Singer, 
I do not believe it is a point that is made 
clearly, and the fault, in this case of mis­
understanding, ought certainly, I think, 
to be laid at my door. 
(2) The coherence of utilitarianism 
In my essay I distinguished between what I 
called the equality of interests principle 
and the equality of treatment principle. 
In his response, Singer writes as follows: 
The only principle of equality I hold is 
the principle that the interests of every 
being affected by an action are to be taken 
into account and given the same weight as 
the like interests of any other being . . . 
(U)tilitarianiso presupposes this prin­
ciple (the equality of interests principle). 
The principle of equality of intersts 
merely makes it explicit that, because the 
principle of utility is the sole basis of 
morality, no other principle will limit 
the application of the principle of utility, 
or affect the way in which it operates 
(pp. 328-29). 
In my earlier critique of Singer I was pre­
pared to grant the equality of interests 
principle (henceforth sometimes referred to 
as "the equality principle") to utilitar­
ianism, on the grounds that that theory pre­
supposes it. I now have serious doubts about 
the wisdom of being so generous to utilitar­
ianism, doubts which the passage from Singer, 
just quoted, intensify rather than placate. 
For if the equality principle is presupposed 
by the principle of utility, and if, in 
Singer's words, the equality principle 
"limit (s) the application of the principle 
of utility," then it appears inconsistent to 
soleclaim that utility is "the a  basis of 
morality." For it cannot be true that utility 
is the sole basis if, in addition to utility, 
the equality principle also is basic to 
morality. And it cannot be true that utility 
forms the basis of morality after a11,if, as 
contends, the principle of utilitySipger COnten
"presupposes" that of equality and is "limited" 
by the principle. It is, it seems to me, a 
deficient because incoherent ethical theory 
that asserts both that the principle of 
~tility is the sole basis of morality and 
that there is another principle (equality) 
that is presupposed by utility and limits it. 
But perhaps Singer believes that the equality 
principle is a formal, not a moral, principle. 
so that the limits it places on utilitarianism 
are not moral but logical or quasi-logical. 
And it is true that, if this is the way he 
views the equality principle, then the 
charge of incoherence, advanced in the argu­
ment in the preceding paragraph, could in 
principle be met. But only at a price. 
For, first, we will want a very careful 
argument before it can be reasonable to 
agree that equality is a formal principle, 
an argument which, I  believe it is fair 
to say, Singer has not yet advanced in the 
writings presently available to us. 6 But, 
second, and for present purposes more 
importantly, if equality is supposed by 
Singer to have the status of a formal 
principle, then of course it cannot also be 
supposed that that principle is the exclu­
sive property of utilitarians. True, 
many non-utilitarians (e.g., Kant and 
Aquinas) have argued in ways that ~t least 
seem to violate the equality principle's 
strictures, arguing, it may be alleged, 
that though animals and humans have 
similar interests, the interests of 
humans nevertheless are more important 
than the like interests of animals. 
But from the fact, assuming that it is 
a fact, that some non-utilitarians have 
argued in this way, it does not fol19w that all 
non-utilitarians must do so. And this does not 
follow even if we suppose that all utilitarians 
have been uniformly successful in respecting 
the equality principle. 7 In particular, 
it does not follow that a rights-based 
theory, one in Yhich basic moral rights 
are postulated even in the case of 
some non-human animals, must violate 
the principle of the equality of 
interests or cannot insist that this 
principle be honored. Thus, if, in 
order to avoid the problem of the 
utilitar­coherence of his version of 
ianism, Singer were to endorse the 
view that the equality principle is 
a formal principle, then he would also 
be obliged to recognize that it is a 
principle whose use is not limited to 
utilitarian moralists. 
The same is cthe·r consid­
true of o
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restricted co utilitarian moralists but 
mighc consistently be advanced by other, 
decidedly non-utilitarian theorists 
including those who advance a rights­
based theory. These considerations 
include the following: 
(1) Modern farming methods inflict
 
much suffering on animals.

 
(2) A vegetarian diet "does not involve
 
great sacrifices, not in our health,

 
nor in our capacity to feed growing

the  






(3) Being a "something
vegetarian is  
which 'underpins, makes consistent, and

 
gives meaning to all our activities
other  
on behalf of animals.'" (P. quoted

336,  
from Animal Liberation, p. 171.)

 
(4) "(B)ecoming a vegetarian is a way
 
of attesting to sincerity

the depth and  
of one's belief in the wrongness of

 
what we are doing to animals" (p. 337).

 
All these considerations are in principle 
available to advocates of positions other 
than the utilitarian one advocated by Singer, 
and though I do not think Singer actually 
says anything that clearly implies that 
he thinks otherwise, it is important to 
make this point very clear, since someone 
might be misled into thinking that, since 
these considerations are of great moral 
importance and since they occupy a place 
of central importance in Singer's account 
of the utilitarian basis for vegetarianism, 
they are necessarily restricted to utilitarians. 
My point is that this would be as mistaken a 
view of the logic of these considerations as 
it would be to view the equality principle, if 
that principle is supposed to be formal, as 
~ie exclusive property of utilitarians. 
(3)� Singer's attempt vegetarianism
to base  
on utility
 
But the above considerations, though they 
are not limited to utilitarian moralists, 
cannot be denied them, either, and we may 
assume, for present purposes, that these 
considerations collectively do go some way 
coward prOViding the utilitarian basis 
for vegetarianism that Singer seeks. The 
question is whether, when coupled with the 
other considerations Singer advances, the 
basis he seeks has been achieved. I do 
not believe it has, for several reasons. 
I shall limit myself to only two. 
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First, Singer, responding to various 
critics' accusations that being a 
vegetarian must be a largely symbolic 
gesture for someone with his utilitarian 
predilections, since one person's boycotting 
meat will fail to make any difference to 
the way animals are treated in factory 
farming, replies that in the case of 
chickens, for example, "there must be some 
point at which the number of vegetarians 
makes a difference to the size of the 
poultry industry. There must be a series 
of thresholds,� the market system hidden by 
of distribution, which determine how many 
factory farms will be in existence. In 
this case one more person becoming a 
vegetarian will make no difference at 
all, unless that individual, added to the 
others who are� reduces already vegetarians, 
demand below the threshold level at which 
a new factory farm would have started up 
(or an existing one would have remained 
production,� if industry is declining)"in  
(p. 335). Whether we now know what these
 
"thresholds" are is a matter I shall
 
return to briefly, when I turn to my second

 
point below. What I now wish to stress is
 
the paradoxical nature of of

this aspect  
Singer's utilitarian basis of obli­

the 
gation to be vegetarian. What it comes to,

 
I believe, is that,in being a vegetarian

 
I am doing what I ought to do only if it
 
happens to be true people

that enough other  
happen also to be vegetarians so when

that,  
the effects of their boycotting meat are

 
joined with the effects of my boycott, it
 





that would have been raised  
a factory farm are spared that fate. If,

 
on the other hand, the effects of our

 
collective boycott happen not to make any

 




in being  
we are not doing what we ought to do, not

 
because of any failing on our (assume

part  
we work very hard to but

persuade others  
fail to do so), but because of effects

the  
of the decisions of others (i.e., non­


vegetarians), whose demand for meat more

 
than offsets the effect of our boycott. . 
But to make the rightness of what vegetarians 
do contingent upon the decisions of those 
very persons Whow  are doing what vegetarians 
deplore--and Singer's view does imply this, 
I think--is paradoxical at best, all the 
more so when we pause to observe that, on 
this view, all that non-vegetarians need do, 
in order co insure that they escape the 
obligation to be vegetarian, as this is 
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fa~tory farming, is to continue doing pre­
cisely what it is that they are presently 
doing--namely living as non-vegetarians! And 
if, perchance, the ranks of vegetarians were 
to swell to such a degree that their collective 
impact on factory farming ~ould close this or 
that intensive rearing operation, the non­
vegetarians, given Singer's position, could 
still take steps to escape obligatori­the 
ness of vegetarianism, as this is assessed 
by the impact of vegetarians on factory 
farming. All that non-vegetarians would 
need do is ~ more meat, thereby negating 
the collective effect of the vegetarians. 
I am not saying that the non-vegetarians 
would be doing what is right in this case. 
Quite the contrary. What I am suggesting 
is that Singer cannot argue that what they 
are doing is wrong, by appeal to the impact 
of alternative diets on factory farming. 
Granted, the number of persons who are 
vegetarians does bear on the number of 
animals raised in factory farms; and granted 
that vegetarians must profoundly wish that 
their individual. and collective efforts 
will ultimately reduce the number of animals 
so raised; nevertheless, the obligation to 
be vegetarian cannot be grounded in these 
considerations, I believe, except at the 
price of the paradox Singer's view is heir 
to. 
My second point is this. The central 
problem for Singer, I believe, is that, in 
order ror him consistently to press the 
moral case for vegetarianism, he must be 
in a position to claim to know both what 
are the likely consequences of a gradual 
or sudden shift to a vegetarian diet, as 
compared with the consequences of the present 
global dietary habits, and to know that the 
consequences of the shi~to vegetarianism 
are likely to be better, all considered, than 
the consequences that. would obtain from perpetu­
ating present practices. In my previous essay I 
acknowledged the great deb t we owe to . 
Singer and others for awakening us to the 
harsh realities of factory farming. What 
I failed to take note of, and what Singer, 
in his reply, reaffirms, is that he has 
also set forth other, consid­relevant 
erationS that bear on the question of
 
consequences--e.g., that "a vegetarian
 
diet does not involve great sacrifices,
 
not in our health, nor in our capacity to
 
feed the forwing world population, nor
 
in the pleasures of the palate" (p. 333).
 
consider­Even granting these additional 
ations, however, I believe that the episte­
mological problems that must haunt all versions 
of utilitarianism cast their oppressive 
shadow over Singer's attempt to base 
vegetarianism on his version of that theory. 
For it is not enough to know, for example, 
that there are "thresholds" beyond which the 
collective impact of vegetarians does make 
a difference to how many factory farms there 
are. One wants to know what these thres­
holds actuallv~. Or, again, it is not 
enough to know that, by a gradual or sudden 
switch, by a substantial number of present 
meat-eaters, "our capacity to feed the 
growing world population" will be increased. 
What one also wants to know is whether, 
given that we could feed more people, we 
(a) will and (b) ought to. As for (a), 
there are enormously complicated economic 
questions involved, in particular whether, 
given a substantial decline in the animal 
industry's demand for corn, oats, etc., 
there will be sufficiently attractive eco­
nomic incentives for farmers to produce 
amounts of grain and other foodstuffs that 
would be sufficient to feed an ever growing 
world population, an economic possibility 
that needs a sound empirical basis, not 
hopeful speculation, if the case for its 
likelihood is to be established, as it must 
be if, like Singer, we rest the case for 
vegetarianism on the likely consequences of 
alternative courses of action. And as for 
(b), what needs to be shown, not assumed, 
is that the consequences of feeding an ever 
expanding global population are preferable 
to taking other, possibly drastic steps 
(e.g., involuntary sterilization) to put 
a lid on population growth. Of course 
there are some for whom easy recourse to 
such drastic steps will clash with their 
understandings of basic human rights or 
common moral intuitions. But it is abso­
lutely essential to realize that Singer 
will have none of this--not appeals to moral 
rights, since such appeals are, to him, 
merely "a concessiOn to populaI' I'hetoric,"S 
not appeals to "our common moral intuitions" 
since, in his view, this "inbuilt conser­
vatism . . . is liable to take relics of 
our cultural history as the touchstones of 
morality" (p. 326). For Singer, all and 
everything turns on consequences. And, 
because of this, the burden of fix1nS 
and weighing all the. relevant conse­
quences must be dutifully borne by him, 
which is why his putative utilitarian 
basis for vegetarianism must prin­in 
ciple be far more complicated, 1 
believe, than even his reply suggests he 
thinks. All of the likely consequences, 





practices, for all the affected parties, in 
all the affecte~arts of the globe, 
in both the short and the long run, must 
be fixed and weighed, and the case for 
vegetarianism must be established on this 
basis alone. I hope it neither is nor seems 
unfair to say that, despite the advances 
Singer has made in sketching the broad 
outlines of a utilitarian case for vege­
carianism, he has yet to marshall enough 
detailed empirical findings (e.g., detailed 
studies regarding its impact on population 
growth) to give a finished or compelling 
utilitarian basis for the way of life he 
advocates. 
Now, there is, I believe, a way around 
chis problem for those who wish to argue 
for the obligatoriness of vegetarianism, 
and one that does not oblige us to endorse 
the "wrong-headed" view that consequences 
are altogether irrelevant to the determi­
nation of what is right or wrong. This is 
che position set forth in my original essay 
on the moral basis of vegetarianism. 10 It 
involves arguing, to summarize that position 
crudely, that the burden of proof falls on 
those who harm the innocent to show why, 
in doing so, they do not violate the right 
of the innocent not to be harmed, and that, 
unless or until those who themselves harm 
the innocent, or actively support others 
who do so, succeed in showing that they 
are not gUiltyui  of violating the rights of 
the innocent, we are justified in viewing 
their conduct as violative of the rights 
in question. These abstract principles 
are then applied to the case of our culture's 
use of animals as a food source, both 
within and outside the context of factory 
farming, the conclusion being that unless 
or until we are shown that raising and killing 
animals do not violate their rights, we 
are rationally entitled to believe and 
morally required to act as if they do. 
Thus, considerations about consequences 
are ~ ruled out as irrelevant by my 
position, since whether rights are violated 
will turn on considerations that include 
considerations about consequences. aut, 
u~like Singer's, my position does not put 
the burden of proof on me to fix and weigh 
all the likely consequences, on all the 
interested parties, in all parts of the 
globe, etc. The burden is placed on the 
non-vegetarian. 




the moral basis of vegetarianism  
be advanced only on the condition that I
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(or other vegetarians) succeed in fixing 
and weighing all the relevant consequences 
is, I think, one of its significant strengths, 
just as the opposite requirement, in the 
case of Singer's position, is, I think, one 
of its special weaknesses. Whether it is 
possible to provide a rationally compelling 
theoretical basis for a position like mine 
without having recourse to rights is unclear 
to me. But unless the burden of proof is 
shifted, as my argument attempts, the case 
for vegetarianism can never in principle be 
any more certain than our knowledge concern­
ing the likely consequences, of our being 
or not being vegetarians, on all those 
affected, in all parts of the globe, etc .• 
etc. The enormous burden of providing 
this elusive knowledge, I believe, should 
be borne, not by those who are vegetarians, 
but by those who are not, and it is one of 
the virtues of the use of the notion of 
moral rights, a virtue that utilitarianism 
lacks, that it provides us with the argu­
mentative means of shifting the burden to 




lUnless otherwise indicated, page refer­
ences following quotations are to this 
essay by Singer.
2r have explored the moral status of 
non-paradigmatic humans in some detail. 
See my "An Examination and Defense of 
One Argument Concerning Animal Rights," 
Inquirv, Summer, 1979. 
~The difficulties justice causes for 
utilitarianism are well known, but I am 
inclined to believe that considerations 
as diverse as the theoretical foundations 
of environmental ethics and the value of 
friendship also highlight utilitarianism's 
shortcomings. On the ill-fit between 
utilitarianism and environmental ethics, 
see my "The Nature and Possibility of An 
Environmental Ethic" (Environmental 
Ethics) forthcoming. On the difficulties 
the value of friendship causes for utili­
tarian theory, see my "A Refutation of 
Utilitarianism" (under reView). 
4See in particular my "The Moral Basis 
of Vegetarianism," The Canadian Journal 
of Philosoohv, October, 1975. Selections 
from this essay are reprinted in Animal 
Rights and Human Obligations, edited 
by Tom Regan and Peter Singer (Englewood 
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Todav's Second Edition,rod y Moral Problems, 
edit~d (New York:i e by Richard Wasserstrom 
Macmillan) 1979. See also my "Animal 
Rights, Human Wrongs," Environmental 
Ethics, Summer, 1980. This essay also 
will appear, in Polish, in Etyka, forth­-
coming. 
5See , for example, my "Ait  Defense of 
Pacifism," The Canadian Journal of 
PhilosophY, January, 1972, reprinted 
in Todav'srod  Moral Problems, Ed~tion,
n e~
First dit  
edited by Richard Wasserstrom (New York: 
Macmillan) 1975. 
6Perhaps it will be objected that Singer 
does not regard the equality principle as
a principle that is distinct from pr~n­
~
the i -
ciple of utility, despite the fact that he 
st.ates that utilitarianism "presupposes" 
the eoualityq  principle. If this were true, 
then ~he taken out of the charget sting would be 
of incoherence just leveled against his 
position. The available evidence seems to 
be against this defense of ~owever,Singer, h ever  
since we find, in his Practical Eth~cs,.t i ,  
!£ pr~n­
t.hat Singer attempts to argue to the i -
ciole thep of utility from acceptance  of 
eq~ality principl~racticalEthicsual y inciple (Practi l , 
Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 11­-
12). All indications are, then, that   
Singer does the two principles,as
regard   
distinct and also believes equal~ty
that ali y
is more basic than utility. And that,   
as I have argued in the above, inco­
is -
herent, if (a) the principle of utility   II 
is said morality,
to be "the sole basis of "  
if (b) itself

the equality principle is  
viewed as a substantive moral principle, and

  
if (c) the "presupposed"

latter principle is  
by the former, in the sense that we are

  
supposed to be able to argue acceptance

from  





that of  
7Singer at utilitarian~least suggests that t itarians 
historically have been successful in respecting 
the equality of interests principle, and ~t
P7 ~ng
i  
is true that both Bentham and Mill, for   
example, ~ni~al
clearly indicate that a m l inter­-
count for something. ~t ~sests But i i not 
clear at all that they think that we are 
constrained to count the like interests of 
animals and humans equally. On this see my 
l'1illdiscussion of ' i11 in "The Moral Basis of   
Vegetartani,sm," cit. . .£E.. 
SThe pioneering work of Harrison

Ruth  
always deserves special mention. her

See  





Singer "The Parable of Fox

9peter , the  Unliber~ted Ethics,
and the n1i era ed Animals,"  
January, 1978, p. 122.
  
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